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We propose parametric constructive Kripke-semantics for multi-agent
KD45-belief and S5-knowledge in terms of elementary set-theoretic con-
structions of two basic functional building blocks, namely bias (or view-
point) and visibility, functioning also as the parameters of the doxastic
and epistemic accessibility relation. The doxastic accessibility relates two
possible worlds whenever the application of the composition of bias with
visibility to the first world is equal to the application of visibility to the
second world. The epistemic accessibility is the transitive closure of the
union of our doxastic accessibility and its converse. Therefrom, accessi-
bility relations for common and distributed belief and knowledge can be
constructed in a standard way. As a result, we obtain a general definition
of knowledge in terms of belief that enables us to view S5-knowledge as
accurate (unbiased and thus true) KD45-belief, negation-complete belief
and knowledge as exact KD45-belief and S5-knowledge, respectively, and
perfect S5-knowledge as precise (exact and accurate) KD45-belief, and all
this generically for arbitrary functions of bias and visibility. Our results
can be seen as a semantic complement to previous foundational results by
Halpern et al. about the (un)definability and (non-)reducibility of knowl-
edge in terms of and to belief, respectively.
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In [HSS09], the problem of defining knowledge in terms of belief is studied
from a modal logic perspective, where the authors show that “if knowledge
satisfies any set of axioms contained in S5, then it cannot be explicitly defined
in terms of belief. S5 knowledge can be implicitly defined by belief, but not
reduced to it.” Thereby, the standard notions of explicit and implicit definability
from first-order logic are “lifted to the definability of modalities in modal logics
in a straightforward way,” so that “explicit definability is equivalent to the
combination of implicit definability and reducibility.” More precisely, [HSS09]:
Consider a logic Λ for knowledge and belief. Knowledge is explic-
itly defined in Λ if there is a formula DK (for “definition of knowl-
edge”) in Λ of the form Kp↔ δ, where δ is a formula that does not
mention the knowledge operator. Knowledge is implicitly defined in
Λ if, roughly speaking, Λ “determines” knowledge uniquely. Syn-
tactically, this determination means that any two modal operators
for knowledge that satisfy Λ must be equivalent. Semantically, this
means that two Kripke models of Λ with the same set of worlds that
agree on the interpretation of belief (and on the interpretations of
all primitive propositions) must agree also on the interpretation of
knowledge.
Our contribution is to make the definability of S5-knowledge in terms of KD45-
belief function-parametric as well as semantic-constructive (cf. Definition 3–8).
More precisely, we propose function-parametric constructive Kripke-semantics
for multi-agent KD45-belief and S5-knowledge in terms of elementary set-theoretic
constructions of two basic functional building blocks, namely (cf. Definition 2):
• bias, or viewpoint translocation (necessarily idempotent, e.g., the constant
functions), and
• visibility transformation, for example:
– point confounding (non-injective when non-trivial), and/or
– point confusing (or permuting, bijective on a sub-domain)
functioning also as the parameters of the doxastic and epistemic accessibility re-
lation. Note that we mean “set-theoretically constructive,” not “intuitionistic,”
in loose analogy with the set-theoretically constructive rather than the purely
axiomatic definition of numbers [Fef89] or ordered pairs.1 That is:
• our epistemic accessibility is the transitive closure of the union of our
doxastic accessibility and its converse (cf. Definition 4);
• our doxastic accessibility relates two possible worlds whenever the appli-
cation of the composition of bias with visibility to the first world is equal
to the application of visibility to the second world (cf. Definition 3).
1E.g., the now standard definition by Kuratowski or other well-known definitions [Mos06].
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As a result, our constructions enable us to view
• S5-knowledge as accurate (unbiased and thus true) KD45-belief,
• negation-complete belief and knowledge as exact KD45-belief and S5-
knowledge, respectively,
• perfect S5-knowledge as precise (exact and accurate) KD45-belief, and
all this generically for arbitrary functions of bias and visibility in our sense (cf.
Theorem 3). In comparison, recall from [FHMV95] the by-now classic construc-
tive definition of agent-centric (say in agent a) epistemic accessibility ≡a as
state (say s and s′) indistinguishability s ≡a s′ defined in terms of the equality
between the projection pia(s) of s onto a’s view and the projection pia(s
′) :
Definition 1 (Epistemic accessibility as state indistinguishability [FHMV95]).
s ≡a s′ by definition, if and only if pia(s) = pia(s′).
Thus ≡a is defined to be the kernel of pia [SD08]. This definition is construc-
tive in the sense that it not merely abstractly stipulates ≡a to be an equivalence
relation (that would be the standard modal-logical methodology [MV07]) but it
actually concretely constructs ≡a in terms of the set-theoretic building block pia,
a projection function (state visibility as state projection), which forces ≡a to be
an equivalence relation. (For more examples of more complex, constructive def-
initions of agent-centric accessibility relations, see [Kra12a, Kra12c, Kra12b].)
It is not at all obvious how to recover a definition of doxastic accessibility from
this indistinguishability definition of epistemic accessibility. Nevertheless we
present a simple, generic, and thus general solution to this important problem.
Our solution is general in the sense that the extent to which it can be applied is
the entire semantic scope (models) of standard doxastic and epistemic logic (cf.
[MV07] and [HR10] for overviews), thanks to our soundness and completeness
results in the sense of Theorem 1 and 2. Moreover, our proofs for the solution
are simple, which increases its value. Here, the difficulty was to find our general
definition of knowledge in terms of belief, which has even the feature of being
generic thanks to its function parameters. Our findings can be seen as a se-
mantic complement to previous foundational results by Halpern et al. about the
(un)definability and (non-)reducibility of knowledge in terms of and to belief,
respectively.
2 Parametric constructions and results
Let
• S designate a set of system states in computer-science, points in modal-
logical, or possible worlds in philosophical terminology;
• idS′ := {(s, s) | s ∈ S ′} the identity function on S ′ ⊆ S ;
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• Im(R) := {s′ ∈ S | there is s ∈ S such that s R s′} the image of some
(possibly functional) relation R ⊆ S × S .
Further let “:iff” abbreviate “by definition, if and only if”.
Definition 2 (Doxastic-epistemic function pair). Two functions f : S → S and
g : Im(f)→ Im(f) form a doxastic-epistemic function pair (f, g) on S :iff
• for all s, s′ ∈ S, if g(f(s)) = f(s′) then g(f(s′)) = f(s′) ;
• or, equivalently, g is idempotent, i.e., g ◦ g = g .
Fact 1. For all doxastic-epistemic function pairs (f, g) on S and s ∈ S there is
s′ ∈ S such that g(f(s)) = f(s′) .
Proof. By the definitional fact that f is a totally defined operation on S and g
is a totally defined operation on Im(f); (Im(g) ⊆ Im(f)).
We shall use the two constraints in Definition 2 interchangeably; the two
constraints are indeed equivalent, as asserts the following proposition.
Proposition 1. The two alternative constraints in Definition 2 are equivalent.
Proof. Let f : S → S and g : Im(f) → Im(f). For the if-direction, suppose
that for all s, s′ ∈ S, if g(f(s)) = f(s′) then g(f(s′)) = f(s′). Further let s ∈ S.
By Fact 1, there is s′ ∈ S such that g(f(s)) = f(s′). Hence g(f(s)) = g(f(s′)),
and also g(g(f(s))) = g(f(s′)). Hence g(g(f(s))) = g(f(s)). For the only-
if-direction, suppose that g ◦ g = g, and let s, s′ ∈ S. Further suppose that
g(f(s)) = f(s′). Hence g(g(f(s))) = g(f(s′)). Hence g(f(s)) = g(f(s′)) by the
idempotency of g. Hence g(f(s′)) = f(s′) by the last supposition.
Definition 3 (Function-Parametric Doxastic Accessibility). Let (f, g) designate
a doxastic-epistemic function pair on S. Then we define our (f, g)-parametric
doxastic accessibility relation Dgf ⊆ S × S such that for all s, s′ ∈ S,
s Dgf s
′ :iff g(f(s)) = f(s′) .
The following main adequacy theorem asserts first that for all doxastic-
epistemic function pairs (f, g), Dgf is indeed a standard doxastic accessibility
relation, and second that for all standard doxastic accessibility relations R, a
doxastic-epistemic function pair (f, g) can be constructed such that R = Dgf .
Theorem 1 (The KD45 Accessibility Schema).
1. Soundness: If (f, g) is a doxastic-epistemic function pair on S then for
all s ∈ S :
(a) there is s′ ∈ S such that s Dgf s′ (Seriality/Totality)
(b) for all s′, s′′ ∈ S :
i. if s Dgf s
′ and s′ Dgf s
′′ then s Dgf s
′′ (Transitivity)
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ii. if s Dgf s
′ and s Dgf s
′′ then s′ Dgf s
′′ (Euclideanness)
2. Completeness: If ∅ 6= R ⊆ S×S is serial, transitive, and Euclidean then
there is a doxastic-epistemic function pair (f, g) on S such that (f, g) is
constructible from R and R = Dgf .
Proof. For soundness, assume that (f, g) is a doxastic-epistemic function pair on
S. Then 1.a holds by Fact 1. For 1.b, let s, s′, s′′ ∈ S and suppose that g(f(s)) =
f(s′). Hence g(f(s′)) = f(s′) by the first alternative definitional constraint on f
and g. For 1.b.i, further derive that g(f(s)) = g(f(s′)) by the last supposition,
and then further suppose that g(f(s′)) = f(s′′). Hence g(f(s)) = f(s′′). For
1.b.ii, suppose that g(f(s)) = f(s′′). Consequently, f(s′) = f(s′′) by the last
supposition and the first supposition of 1.b, and then g(f(s′)) = f(s′′) by the
very first derivation.
For completeness, let ∅ 6= R ⊆ S×S and suppose that R is serial, transitive,
and Euclidean. Then ≡ := {(s, s′) ∈ R | s ∈ Im(R)} ⊆ R is an equivalence
relation (i.e., a relation that is reflexive, transitive, and Euclidean) on Im(R) :
• ≡ is reflexive: Let s ∈ Im(R), i.e., there is s′ ∈ S such that s′ R s. Thus
s ∈ S. Hence there is s′′ ∈ S such that s R s′′ by the seriality of R. Hence
s′ R s′′ by the transitivity of R. Hence s′′ R s by the Euclideanness of R.
Hence s R s by the transitivity of R. And since s ∈ Im(R), s ≡ s.
• ≡ is transitive and Euclidean by inheritance, i.e., simply because R is.
For each s ∈ Im(R), choose cs ∈ [s]≡ such that for all s′ ∈ S, if [s]≡ = [s′]≡
then cs = cs′ . Observe that for all s
′, s′′ ∈ S, if s R s′ and s R s′′ then
there is C ∈ Im(R)/≡ such that s′, s′′ ∈ C. This is because s′ R s′′ by the
Euclideanness of R and because s′, s′′ ∈ Im(R) (thus s′ ≡ s′′). Now define two
functions f : S → S and g : Im(f)→ Im(f) such that:
f : s 7→
{
cs if s ∈ Im(R) ,
s if s 6∈ Im(R) ;
g : s 7→
{
s if s ∈ Im(R) ,
cs′ if s 6∈ Im(R) and s R s′.
Notice that g is well defined, i.e., it does not matter which s′ we choose, since for
all s′′ ∈ S, if s R s′ and s R s′′ then there is C ∈ Im(R)/≡ such that s′, s′′ ∈ C.
We will now see that R = Dgf . So let s, s
′ ∈ S.
• Suppose that s R s′. Thus s′ ∈ Im(R). Hence f(s′) = cs′ .
– Suppose that s ∈ Im(R). Hence s ≡ s′ by the first two suppositions
(thus cs = cs′), and g(f(s)) = g(cs) = cs. Hence g(f(s)) = f(s
′).
– Now suppose that s 6∈ Im(R). Hence g(f(s)) = g(s) = cs′′ for some
s′′ ∈ S such that s R s′′. Hence s′ R s′′ by the Euclideanness of R,
and then s′ ≡ s′′. Thus cs′ = cs′′ . Hence g(f(s)) = f(s′).
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• Conversely suppose that g(f(s)) = f(s′). Notice in the definition of f and
g that Im(g) ⊆ Im(R) and that s′ ∈ Im(R) if and only if f(s′) ∈ Im(R).
Hence s′ ∈ Im(R), and thus f(s′) = cs′ . Hence g(f(s)) = cs′ .
– Suppose that s ∈ Im(R). Hence g(f(s)) = g(cs) = cs. Hence cs = cs′
and thus s ≡ s′. Hence s R s′.
– Now suppose that s 6∈ Im(R). Hence g(f(s)) = g(s) = cs′′ for some
s′′ ∈ S such that s R s′′. Hence cs′′ = cs′ , and thus s′′ ≡ s′. Hence
s′′ R s′. Hence s R s′ by the transitivity of R.
The following proposition gives a functional characterisation of (i.e., a nec-
essary and sufficient equational condition for) the symmetry (and hence the
property of being an equivalence relation) of (f, g)-parametric doxastic accessi-
bility relations. (Seriality, symmetry, and transitivity jointly imply reflexivity.)
Proposition 2 (Doxastic symmetry characterisation). For all (f, g)-parametric




−1 if and only if g = idIm(f) .




−1, i.e., for all s, s′ ∈ S, g(f(s)) = f(s′) if and only if g(f(s′)) = f(s).
Further, let s ∈ S. Hence there is s′ ∈ S such that g(f(s)) = f(s′) by Fact 1.
Hence g(f(s′)) = f(s) by the first supposition, and also g(g(f(s))) = g(f(s′)).
Hence, g(f(s)) = g(f(s′)) by the idempotency of g, and then g(f(s)) = f(s).
The following is our general definition of knowledge in terms of belief.
Definition 4 (Function-Parametric Epistemic Accessibility). Let Dgf designate
an (f, g)-parametric doxastic accessibility. Then we define our (f, g)-parametric
epistemic accessibility relation Egf ⊆ S × S such that
Egf := (D
g
f ∪ (Dgf )−1)+,
where ‘−1’ designates the converse and ‘+’ the transitive-closure operation.
The following adequacy theorem asserts first that for all doxastic-epistemic
function pairs (f, g), Egf is indeed a standard epistemic accessibility relation,
and second that for all standard epistemic accessibility relations ≡, a doxastic-
epistemic function pair (f, g) can be constructed such that ≡ = Egf .
Theorem 2 (The S5 Accessibility Schema).
1. Soundness: If Dgf is an (f, g)-parametric accessibility relation then E
g
f
is the smallest equivalence relation containing Dgf .
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2. Completeness: If ∅ 6= ≡ ⊆ S×S is an equivalence relation then there is a
doxastic-epistemic function pair (f, g) on S such that (f, g) is constructible
from ≡ and ≡ = Egf .
Proof. For soundness, consider that since Dgf is serial and transitive by construc-
tion, and since the converse operation preserves the seriality and transitivity of
Dgf , E
g
f is so too. Finally, since E
g
f is symmetric by construction, E
g
f is also
reflexive, and thus an equivalence relation containing Dgf . (Seriality, symme-
try, and transitivity jointly imply reflexivity.) To see that Egf is the smallest
such relation, recall from [SD08] that for arbitrary R ⊆ S × S, the relation
(R ∪ (R)−1 ∪ idS)∗ is the smallest equivalence relation containing R, where ‘∗’
is the reflexive-transitive-closure operation. However, we can spare idS and the
reflexive closure, since idS ⊆ Egf is reflexive by construction.
For completeness, suppose that ∅ 6= ≡ ⊆ S × S is an equivalence relation.
Then for each equivalence class C ∈ S/≡, choose c ∈ C and define pi(s) := c
for all s ∈ C. Clearly, ≡ = DidIm(pi)pi , and DidIm(pi)pi = EidIm(pi)pi (see also Proposi-
tion 3.2). Thus ≡ = EidIm(pi)pi .
The following proposition is the basis for our third main result, namely
Theorem 3.
Proposition 3 (Doxastic-epistemic accessibility inclusions). For all doxastic-
epistemic function pairs (f, g) on S :
1. Dgf ⊆ Egf ;
2. Dgf = E
g
f if and only if g = idIm(f) ;
3. idS = EidSidS = D
idS
idS .
Proof. For 1, inspect definitions. 2 follows from Proposition 2 and the definition
of Egf . For 3, inspect 2.
Definition 5 (Doxastic-epistemic similarity type). Let
• P 6= ∅ designate some set of atomic propositions P ;
• T a set of types T such that S ∈ T ;
• G a set of typed function names g : T → T ′ (abbreviated as g when clear
from context) such that (idT : T → T ) ∈ G for all T ∈ T ;
• F a set of typed function names f : S → T (abbreviated as f when clear
from context) such that (idS : S → S) ∈ F and if (f : S → T ) ∈ F and
(h : T → T ′) ∈ F ∪ G then (h ◦T f : S→ T ′) ∈ F ;
• ΠB ,ΠK ⊆ Π := {(f : T → T ′, g : T ′ → T ′′) ∈ F × G} belief-label and
knowledge-label sets, and the so-called label set, respectively.
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Then,
Σ := (P, T ,G,F ,ΠB ,ΠK)
is a doxastic-epistemic similarity type.
Note the above-introduced notational conventions: we use f, g, and h as
meta-variables for typed function names, and f , g, and h as meta-variables for
typed functions; idS is an example of a (typed) function name, and idS is an
example of a (typed) function.
Definition 6 (Functional doxastic-epistemic language). Given a doxastic-epi-
stemic similarity type Σ with set P of atomic propositions, and belief- and
knowledge-label set ΠB and ΠK , respectively,
L(Σ) 3 φ ::= P (P ∈ P) | ¬φ | φ ∧ φ
| Bgf(φ) ((f, g) ∈ ΠB)
| Kgf(φ) ((f, g) ∈ ΠK)
is the doxastic-epistemic language over Σ.
We intend for the operators Bgf and K
g
f to have flexible readings, though
they generally relate to belief and knowledge, respectively. We may associate
every pair (f , g ) with an agent a in some given set A of agents (as we do in
Proposition 6). When doing so, we may read Bgf as “agent a believes that φ”
and Kgf as “agent a knows that φ,” where a is the agent associated with the pair
(f , g ).
Definition 7 (Functional doxastic-epistemic models). Given a doxastic-epist-
emic similarity type Σ = (P, T ,G,F ,ΠB ,ΠK), let
• 〈S, ι〉 be a so-called Σ-instantiation structure on S with an interpretation
function ι for types T ∈ T and typed function names constrained such
that:
– ι(S) = S and ι(T ) ⊆ S ;
– ι(idT : T → T ) := idι(T ) ,
ι(h ◦T ′ f : T → T ′′) := ι(h : T ′ → T ′′) ◦ ι(f : T → T ′) ;
– ι(h : T → T ′) is a function h : ι(T ) → ι(T ′) such that if h ∈ G then
h is idempotent;
• 〈S, {Dι(g)ι(f)}(f,g)∈ΠB , {Eι(g)ι(f)}(f,g)∈ΠK 〉 a doxastic-epistemic Σ-frame on 〈S, ι〉;
• V : P → 2S a standard modal valuation function [BvB07], mapping each
atomic proposition P to the set of states where P is considered true.
Then,
S := 〈S, {Dι(g)ι(f)}(f,g)∈ΠB , {Eι(g)ι(f)}(f,g)∈ΠK ,V〉
is the doxastic-epistemic Σ-model on 〈S, ι〉 and V, and (S, s) a pointed
doxastic-epistemic Σ-model on 〈S, ι〉 and V for any s ∈ S.
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Table 1: Doxastic-epistemic satisfaction relation
(S, s) |= P :iff s ∈ V(P )
(S, s) |= ¬φ :iff not (S, s) |= φ
(S, s) |= φ ∧ φ′ :iff (S, s) |= φ and (S, s) |= φ′
(S, s) |= Bgf(φ) :iff for all s′ ∈ S, if s Dι(g)ι(f) s′ then (S, s′) |= φ
(S, s) |= Kgf(φ) :iff for all s′ ∈ S, if s Eι(g)ι(f) s′ then (S, s′) |= φ
Definition 8 (Functional doxastic-epistemic logic). Given a doxastic-epistemic
similarity type Σ = (P, T ,G,F ,ΠB ,ΠK), define
• a standard satisfaction relation |= between pointed doxastic-epistemic Σ-
models and their languages L(Σ) as in Table 1;
• S |= φ :iff for all s ∈ S, (S, s) |= φ ;
• |= φ :iff for all doxastic-epistemic Σ-models S, S |= φ .
Proposition 4 (KD45-belief modality). For all (f, g) ∈ ΠB, Bgf is a KD45-
belief modality. That is:
1. |= Bgf(φ→ φ′)→ (Bgf(φ)→ Bgf(φ′)) (Kripke’s law, K)
2. |= ¬Bgf(⊥) (equivalently, |= Bgf(φ)→ ¬Bgf(¬φ)) (belief consistency, D)
3. |= Bgf(φ)→ Bgf(Bgf(φ)) (positive introspection, 4)
4. |= ¬Bgf(φ)→ Bgf(¬Bgf(φ)) (negative introspection, 5)
5. if |= φ then |= Bgf(φ) (necessitation, N)
Proof. By Theorem 1.1. K and N are forced by Kripke-semantics. The D-law
corresponds to seriality, the 4-law to transitivity, and the 5-law to Euclideanness.
Proposition 5 (S5-knowledge modality). For all (f, g) ∈ ΠK , Kgf is an S5-
belief modality. That is:
1. |= Kgf(φ→ φ′)→ (Kgf(φ)→ Kgf(φ′)) (Kripke’s law, K)
2. |= Kgf(φ)→ φ (truth law, T)
3. |= Kgf(φ)→ Kgf(Kgf(φ)) (positive introspection, 4)
4. |= ¬Kgf(φ)→ Kgf(¬Kgf(φ)) (negative introspection, 5)
5. if |= φ then |= Kgf(φ) (necessitation, N)
Proof. By Theorem 2.1. The T-law corresponds to reflexivity.
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The following theorem summarises our main results.
Theorem 3 (Doxastic-epistemic modality conditionals).
1. |= KidIm(f)f (φ)↔ BidIm(f)f (φ) (knowledge as unbiased belief)
2. |= BidIm(f)f (φ)→ φ (unbiased belief is true belief)
3. |= φ→ KidSidS(φ) (perfect knowledge)
4. |= KidSidS(φ)↔ BidSidS(φ) (perfect knowledge as precise belief)
5. |= Kgf(φ)→ Bgf(φ) (knowledge implies belief, like in [HSS09])
6. bias cancellation:
(a) S |= Kgf(φ)↔ Bgf(φ) if and only if ι(g) = idIm(ι(f)) ,
(b) ι(g) = idIm(ι(f)) if and only if ι(g) is injective;
7. |= ¬BgidS(φ)→ BgidS(¬φ) (negation-complete belief)
8. negation-complete knowledge:
(a) S |= ¬KgidS(φ)→ KgidS(¬φ) if and only if ι(g) is injective,
(b) negation-complete knowledge coincides with perfect knowledge.
Proof. 1 follows from Proposition 3.2; 2 from 1 and Proposition 5.2; 3 and 4
from the left and right equation in Proposition 3.3, respectively; (4 also as an
instance of 1;) 5 from Proposition 3.1; 6.a from Proposition 3.2; 6.b from the
fact that an idempotent function that is also injective must be the identity; 7
from the functionality of D
ι(g)
idS for any ι; 8.a from the functionality of E
ι(g)
idS for
injective ι(g); and 8.b from 8.a, 6.b, and 3.
The following proposition establishes formal correspondences to related work.
Proposition 6 (Related work).
1. Epistemic accessibility as state indistinguishability [FHMV95]: Let
S 3 s ::= 0 | αa(s) ,
where 0 designates a zero data point (e.g., an initial state) and αa an
action performed by agent a ∈ A for some finite set A 6= ∅ of agents, and










pia = ≡a .
Thus we can reconstruct the standard agent-centric epistemic modality Ka





for doxastic-epistemic similarity types such that T := {S}∪{Im(pia) | a ∈
A}, G := {idIm(pia) : Im(pia) → Im(pia) | a ∈ A}, F := {pia : S →
Im(pia) | a ∈ A}, ΠK := {(pia, idIm(pia)) | a ∈ A}, and ΠB := ∅ ; and
an interpretation function ι on types and typed function names such that
ι(Im(pia)) := Im(pia) and ι(pia) := pia , respectively.
The resulting instantiation structure is (S, ι).
2. Epistemic Logic as Dynamic Logic [Par91]: Recall Parikh’s embedding θ
[Par91] of Epistemic Logic [FHMV95] into Propositional Dynamic Logic
[HKT00] with inverse actions [Par78], by which Parikh established an up-
per, EXPTIME complexity bound for Epistemic Logic (also with common
knowledge):
θ(P ) := P
θ(¬φ) := ¬θ(φ)
θ(φ ∧ φ′) := θ(φ) ∧ θ(φ′)
θ(Ka(φ)) := [(αa ∪ (αa)−1)∗]θ(φ) ,
where [(αa∪ (αa)−1)∗] is the dynamic necessity modality with the program
parameter (αa ∪ (αa)−1)∗ for αa as before. Further, let α denote actions,
and A and A′ action terms such as (αa ∪ (αa)−1)∗, and let
S 3 s ::= 0 | αa(s) RA0 := idS
Rα := {(s, α(s)) | s ∈ S} RA1 := RA
RA−1 := (RA)
−1 RAn+1 := RAn ◦ RA1




idS ∪ ERαaidS = R(αa∪(αa)−1)∗ ,
where R(αa∪(αa)−1)∗ is of course an equivalence relation.
Notice that Rαa is not idempotent, and so (idS ,Rαa) is not a doxastic-
epistemic function pair, but fortunately thanks to Theorem 2.2, there is a
constructible pia : S → S such that
(a) EidSpia = idS ∪ E
Rαa
idS , and
(b) (pia, idS) is a doxastic-epistemic function pair.
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3. Interactive Provability as Explicit Belief [Kra12b]: From [Kra12b], recall
the definition of the (idempotent) operator σMa : S → S defined on S 3
s ::= 0 | succMa (s) such that
σMa (s) :=
{
s if M ∈ clsa(∅), and
succMa (s) otherwise (oracle input),
where M designates a proof term, succMa a state constructor, and cl
s
a a
closure operator such that M ∈ clsuccMa (s)a (∅). (Here, the exact nature of
M and clsa is unimportant.) Then,
D
σMa
idS = MRa ,
where MRa is the accessibility relation for the negation-complete proof
modality axiomatised in [Kra12b], obtainable directly as D
σMa
idS .
Proof. For 1, inspect Definition 4 and 1.
For 2, consider:












= (Rαa ∪ (Rαa)−1)∗ (Rαa is functional)




For 3, inspect Definition 3 and [Kra12b].
3 Conclusion
We conclude by mentioning that from Dgf and E
g
f , we can further construct ac-
cessibility relations for modalities of common and distributed belief and knowl-
edge in a standard way [FHMV95, MV07] by taking unions and transitive clo-
sures of Dgf -relations for common belief, unions and reflexive-transitive closures
of Egf -relations for common knowledge, and intersections of D
g
f - and E
g
f -relations
for distributed belief and knowledge, respectively.
For example, accessibility relations DDgC for distributed belief, CD
g
C for com-
mon belief, DEgC for distributed knowledge, and CE
g
C for common knowledge
with respect to doxastic-epistemic function pairs (pia, g) and a community C of
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